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Policymakers’ economics backgrounds vary substantially
across EU and OECD countries
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The appointments of Lucas Papademos in Greece and Mario Monti in Italy in 2011 are
examples of leadership changes intended to bring more competent figures into government.
But why do governments sometimes appoint economic policymakers with economics
training, whilst others do not? Using new research, Mark Hallerberg and Joachim
Wehner suggest that levels of economics education among finance ministers are
substantially higher in new democracies than in old ones, and that the appointment of an
economics PhD as a central bank president is 22 per cent more likely during a banking
crisis.
The f ollowing quotations suggest that ministers who lack technical competence make
bad policy decisions.
“I don’t know what George Osborne’s degree was in. It was certainly not economics.”
– Alex Salmond, First Minister of Scotland.
“In case you are wondering, George Osborne studied history.” -BBC Radio 4. “A Scottish
Pound?” Analysis Programme. 28 January 2013. 
“[ECB President] Draghi countered the view of [German Finance Minister] Schäuble that the
Island Republic of Cyprus is not ‘systemically relevant,’ and that a bankruptcy of the country is
not a danger to the future of the Eurozone. Such a comment is what one hears especially
from lawyers, argued Draghi. The question whether Cyprus is systemically relevant or not is
not a question a lawyer can answer. It is a topic for economists. Schäuble has a degree in
law.” – Spiegel, first seen in Eurointelligence Daily Briefing, 28 January 2013.
Should policymakers be experts in their f ields? This is an especially relevant issue in the midst of  a
f inancial crisis. One potential reason f or crises is that the incompetent people made the wrong decisions.
If  one were to replace these leaders with competent policymakers, then the crisis might end and there
might not be crises in the f uture.
This line of  argument can explain the widespread enthusiasm
Fo rme r Gre e k p rime  ministe r Lucas Pap ad e mo s
By Λο υκάς  Παπαδ ήμο ς  Πρωθ υπο υργό ς  της
Ελλάδ ας  [CC-BY-SA-2.0], via Wikime d ia Co mmo ns
This line of  argument can explain the widespread enthusiasm
both among pundits and in a given population f or the
appointment of  technocratic governments, which are thought
to have ministers with narrow technical skills, who are
expected to produce better policy than their more polit ical, and
more generalist, predecessors. The almost simultaneous
appointments of  Lucas Papademos as prime minister of
Greece and Mario Monti as prime minister of  Italy in November
2011 are examples of  leadership changes that were meant to
bring more competent people into government.
It ’s an empirical question
The truth of  such assertions is – at least on average – an
empirical question. Af ter all, it  is not a priori clear that technical
competence in itself  is a desirable trait.
The staf f s of  ministries and central banks can number
into the thousands and even the tens of  thousands.
A good manager with litt le economic competence may
do as well, or better, than an economics PhD;
A more polit ically inclined economic leader may have
more success in selling and implementing a given policy
than a f ormer economics prof essor.
Bef ore one can consider whether technical competence af f ects policy, however, one f irst has to
understand why governments sometimes appoint such people but of ten do not.
The topic has not been systematically studied. Tim Besley goes as f ar as to claim that the modern
polit ical economy literature “has not only neglected the problem of  polit ical selection, it has been
positively hostile to the topic”. Yet, historical research and a booming industry in polit ical memoirs and
biographies highlight the importance of  the personal characteristics of  leaders f or polit ical choices. For
cit izens, choosing the right people f or polit ical of f ice is arguably no less important than designing
institutions that keep them f rom abusing their powers. Moreover, the empirical study of  personal
characteristics is more advanced in other areas, such as research on the f inancial perf ormance of  f irms.
Polit ical versus economic competencies
We f ocused on the type of  economic policymaker, and considered polit ical competence versus technical
competence. Polit ical competence, in turn, can have two interpretations. One is polit ical skill; a f inance
minister with no economics training may be ef f ective because she can impose spending cuts on her
ministerial colleagues because she has the polit ical ability to do so. A second interpretation is that an
appointment satisf ies a given constituency and has polit ical value regardless of  the (polit ical) skills of
the appointee. By economic policymaker we mean the head of  government (either prime minister or
president), the f inance minister, or the governor or president of  the central bank.
New data on education and occupation backgrounds
We have employed a new dataset that codes the educational and occupational backgrounds of  prime
ministers, f inance ministers, and central bankers f rom 1973 through 2010. The resulting dataset contains
inf ormation on almost 1,200 economic policymakers, 427 prime ministers or presidents (we use the
f ormer as the generic term), 540 f inance ministers, and 216 central bank chief s. Figure 1 summarises our
data on education.
Figure 1 – Comparison of the economic training of economic policymakers
An analytic framework for structuring the empirics
In our recent research we examine the determinants of  economics training. Our model has two parts to it.
The f irst is the demand side – when do governments, and by extension the voters who elect them, want
to have more technically competent economic leaders instead of  generalists? The second part is the
supply side – when is there a constraint on the availability of  technical policymakers?
On the demand side, we f ind that governments appoint more technically competent economic
policymakers during f inancial crises. Those in power during an economic crisis need to gain the
conf idence of  two groups: investors in markets and voters.
First, if  markets baulk at the government’s rescue plan, then it is not possible f or a government to
borrow money at a t ime when it needs f unds quickly. Second, someone bears both the economic and the
f inancial costs of  the crisis. Negotiating a polit ically viable set of  policies to address the crisis is dif f icult.
This is especially important during banking crises – no private actor can buy out the f inancial sector to
solve the crisis, and it f alls to the government to propose solutions and to execute decisions. The
appointment of  a technically competent economic policymaker may help the government gain credibility
with both groups.
A second demand-side reason f or a competent economic leader relates to partisanship. Governments on
the lef t that represent largely labour power have to gain credibility with capital markets to f inance the
state, and they may be more likely to appoint trained economists as either f inance ministers or central
bank governors. While we do not f ind that the lef t always has more technically competent economic
decision-makers, we do f ind that governments on the lef t appoint more technically competent f inance
ministers in years with a stock-market crash.
Third, new democracies select more technically competent leaders. Such governments have greater
incentives to signal technical competence than their counterparts in established democracies. In terms of
economic management, the appointment of  competent economic policymakers f ollowing a transit ion to
democracy can help reassure investors who might be unsettled by polit ical uncertainty.
A f ourth f inding on the demand side counter to our expectations – Eurozone countries are less likely to
have prime ministers with an economics education. We had presumed that membership in an economic
union, in particular the Eurozone, would increase the demand f or more competent economic
policymakers. The responsibilit ies of  the EU more generally are strongly weighted towards economic
policy.
A demand-side perspective on competence, however, is incomplete – another relevant f actor is the
supply side. Why does the availability of  potentially competent leaders vary across countries and across
time?
The f irst such f inding concerns a dif f erence in how parliamentary and presidential systems appoint their
cabinets, which in practice means that presidential systems have more technically competent f inance
ministers. In parliamentary systems, prime ministers may be constrained to select f inance ministers f rom
members of  parliament. Jim Flaherty, the Canadian f inance minister in August 2012 was also a
Conservative member of  parliament f rom Ontario. In contrast, the US secretary of  the treasury, Timothy
Geithner, had no such background. Presidents are theref ore less constrained than prime ministers to
appoint legislators to their cabinets who can help to coordinate the passage of  legislation. For these
reasons, we expect a higher level of  technical competence among presidential appointments. As Robert
Skidelsky quips in his biography of  John Maynard Keynes: “In a Presidential … system he would probably
have been Minister of  Finance.”
A supply-side perspective also suggests that the number of  economically competent individuals who
could be appointed to the cabinet typically declines with a government’s t ime in of f ice. This is especially
true in those parliamentary systems where the main cabinet posit ions are drawn f rom parliament and
where the available pool of  ministerial talent is constrained to legislators – each ministerial change during
an electoral term depletes the stock of  potential ministers. Indeed, the longer a government is in of f ice,
the less technically competent are the f inance ministers appointed, but the more competent are central
bankers.
Implications
Taken together, our results have several interesting implications, and we conclude with just two. Our
f indings add a new twist to Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011), who f ind that democracies are more likely
than dictatorships to select government leaders who have a graduate education. While we do not
consider economic leaders during periods of  dictatorship in our set of  countries, we do have variation
within all democracies.
We f ind that levels of  economics education among f inance ministers are substantially higher in
new democracies than in old ones.
Our work suggests a possible additional piece to the causal story on why democracy matters; It
is not just the f act of  democracy but the age of  that democracy that plays a role.
There are also interesting extensions to the central-banking literature, which notes a big increase in
central-bank independence by the 1990s. Those who consider why some countries have more
independent banks f ocus either on the number of  veto players – more veto players generally leads to
more independent banks and more credible monetary policy – or on ideational change, where there is a
move to more neoliberal thinking about the dif f icult ies of  using inf lation to increase economic growth.
It may require a crisis to change thinking on what sorts of  policies are ef f ective. Indeed, our results
suggest that banking crises can lead to big jumps in the technical competence of  central bank heads in
terms of  their education – the appointment of  an economics PhD as a central bank president is 22
percentage points more likely during a banking crisis.
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